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The institutional design, politics, and effects of a bioregional approach:
observations and lessons from 11 case studies of river basin organizations
Sander Meijerink 1 and Dave Huitema 2,3
ABSTRACT. One of the prescriptions for adaptive comanagement of social-ecological systems is to follow a bioregional approach.
In water resources management, experience has been gained with a bioregional approach by the foundation of river basin organizations
(RBOs). Here, we summarize the results of a research project involving 27 colleagues who have undertaken an analysis of the global
discussion on RBOs and the foundation of RBOs in Canada, USA, Great Britain, Germany, Portugal, South Africa, Ukraine,
Afghanistan, Mongolia, Thailand, and Australia. Drawing on Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development framework, we first
present a fine-grained analysis of the institutional architecture of these RBOs, which enables us to distinguish between autonomous,
coordinating, partnership, and agency type RBOs. Second, we unravel the main controversies over this architecture by focusing on the
key actors involved in either promoting or hindering RBO formation, globally and at the national level. Third, we summarize how the
performance of RBOs can be evaluated in terms of coordination, accountability, legitimacy, and environmental effectiveness. Finally,
we discuss the relationship between institutional design and performance. The main findings are: (1) the foundation of RBOs is not a
neutral process but rather a highly political one, (2) the foundation of RBOs creates complex accountability relationships, and (3)
institutional interplay, the capacity to generate financial resources, and a minimum degree of institutional stability are crucial to the
successes of RBOs in realizing coordination and environmental effectiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the prescriptions for the adaptive comanagement of social-
ecological systems is the bioregional approach. The core idea is
that the management of ecological issues should be organized at
the scale at which these issues manifest themselves. A good
example of a bioregion is a river basin. The water resources
management literature has long recognized that river basins are
logical units for water resources management because of
important relationships between upstream and downstream water
uses and between land and water use within a basin. Because the
boundaries of a river basin usually do not coincide with
administrative boundaries, a large variety of institutional
arrangements for river basin management have been developed.
In the introduction to this special feature (Huitema and Meijerink
2017), we present an ideal typology of river basin organizations
(RBOs), distinguishing between “autonomous,” “agency,”
“coordinating,” and “partnership” type RBOs. These ideal types
represent four different ways in which a bioregional approach can
be institutionalized. Here, we use this typology to characterize
RBOs in 11 river basins across the globe. We include in-depth
studies of four of these RBOs in this special feature: the
Westcountry Rivers Trust in the UK (Cook et al. 2016), the
Breede-Overberg Catchment Management Agency in South
Africa (Meissner et al. 2016), the Mackenzie River Basin Board
in Canada (Morris and de Loë 2016), and the Murray-Daring
Basin Authority in Australia (Ross and Connell 2016).
Information on the other RBOs can be found in Huitema and
Meijerink (2014). To gain a better understanding of the process
of RBO formation, we also analyze which actors supported or
resisted the founding of RBOs. Finally, we will discuss the
functioning of these RBOs in a democratic sense, both in terms
of realizing coordination on a basin scale and in terms of
environmental effectiveness. Based on these findings, we discuss
the relationship between the institutional design and performance
of RBOs.
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS OF
RIVER BASIN ORGANIZATIONS
Results from the application of the ideal typology
Table 1 gives an overview of the countries and the RBOs studied,
combined with a characterization of these RBOs in terms of the
typology, which we presented in the introduction to this special
feature (Huitema and Meijerink 2017). As the typology consists
of so-called ideal types in a Weberian sense, it was to be expected
that none of the RBOs that we included in our study was exactly
identical to the types we had identified. To mention just a few
examples: the Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board is an
agency type RBO because it was given a specific mandate by the
State of Oregon, but at the same time, it shares some
characteristics with both the coordinating and partnership type
RBOs. The German case study of the so-called Erftverband is an
example of an agency type RBO, but because of its fairly
independent position and far reaching competencies, it also shares
some characteristics with the ideal-type autonomous RBO. The
same goes for most other RBOs that have been analyzed.  
Although the collection of case studies presents a far from
random sample of the total population of RBOs (the focus was
on cases that the collected authors were already familiar with), it
is worth reflecting on the types of RBOs that have been discussed
in this collection (Table 1). Agency, coordinating, and partnership
type RBOs are well represented, but only one example of an
autonomous RBO is presented. The limited number of
autonomous RBOs, which are characterized by their independent
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Table 1. Characterization of the river basin organizations (RBOs).
 
Country Name of RBO Type of RBO
Canada Mackenzie River Basin Board Coordinating
United States of America Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board Agency
United Kingdom Westcountry Rivers Trust Partnership
Germany Erftverband Agency
Portugal River Basin District Authorities Autonomous
South Africa Breede-Overberg Catchment Management Agency Agency
Western Bug River Basin Administration Agency
Western Bug River Basin Council Coordinating
Ukraine
Lower Kunduz and Taloquan River Basin Agencies Agency
Lower Kunduz and Taloquan River Basin Councils Coordinating
Afghanistan
River Basin Councils Coordinating
River Basin Administrations Agency
Mongolia
Ping River Basin Committee Coordinating
Mae Kuang Sub-basin working group Coordinating
Thailand
Australia Murray-Darling Basin Authority Agency
Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council Coordinating
Basin community committee Coordinating
position in comparison to other government organizations, is
perhaps not surprising because shifts in governance in the
direction of this type are rare (Schlager and Blomquist 2008).
However, the academic literature on RBOs shows a clear
preference for autonomous governance (Huitema et al. 2009). A
second observation is that in quite a number of cases, we found
more than one RBO in the same basin; often the presence of more
than one RBO takes the form of a combination of an agency and
a coordinating type RBO. In these cases, the agency type of RBO
is given a specific mandate by the national government, and the
coordinating type of RBO aims to broker between subnational
governments, policy sectors, and different societal interests.
Following the account by Jaspers and Gupta (2014), we can
conclude that such institutional layering is not unique for the cases
that we have included in our study. Jaspers and Gupta (2014:44)
refer to the “increasing density of the organisational framework
that operates at multiple levels of governance and has multiple
influences from different social actors.” We conclude that the
typology we proposed in the introduction to this special feature
has proven useful for a basic characterization of the RBOs and
works when one wants to position case studies comparatively in
the institutional landscape. At the same time, the case studies
display a rich institutional variety, layering, and complexity that
cannot be captured easily by suggesting that in every case only a
single type is present.
Rules of all stripes
Having concluded that the typology of RBOs that we developed
is sufficient for a quick scan but has some limitations, we continue
our analysis on the basis of the various rule types that were behind
the typology for a more disaggregated analysis. We derived these
types from Elinor Ostrom“s institutional analysis and
development framework (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). Table 2
summarizes the authority, aggregation, boundary, information,
and pay-off rules for each RBO.
Authority rules
After comparing the authority rules of the RBOs, we observe that
a distinction can be made between RBOs with a narrow mandate
and those with a broad mandate. The Oregon Watershed
Enhancement Board, for instance, was founded only for the
restoration of salmon habitat (Lach and Calvert 2014). In
contrast, the German Erftverband has a broad mandate that
covers groundwater and surface water management, water quality
and quantity, sewerage, waste water treatment, planning, and
monitoring (Hüesker and Bernhardt 2014). It should be noted,
however, that the formal mandate that RBOs have is not always
in line with the issues that they focus on in practice. The Afghan
river basin agencies, for instance, have a very broad mandate on
paper, but in practice, they focus on allocation issues only (Warner
and Thomas 2014).  
We can also conclude that the authorities acquired by RBOs can
derive from multiple sources, and these are different for all types.
The only autonomous RBO we encountered in our study (in
Portugal) derived its authority directly from legislation adopted
by Parliament. In the case of coordinating RBOs, the mandate
depends on the willingness of the contracting parties to transfer
power to the RBO (in the case of the Mackenzie River Basin
Board [Morris and de Loë 2016], these are the Canadian provinces
that founded it). For agency type RBOs, the mandate depends on
the willingness of the “principal” (see Waterman and Meier 1998)
to delegate a certain number of authorities (for examples, see the
Ukrainian [Hagemann and Leidel 2014] and Mongolian
[Dombrowsky et al. 2014] River Basin Administrations and the
Murray-Darling basin organization [Ross and Connell 2016]). In
the case of partnership type RBOs, it is the founding members
who decide on the scope of activities and decision-making power
themselves (e.g., see Westcountry Rivers Trust; Cook et al. 2016).  
Because the 11 case studies had a longitudinal perspective, we
were also able to investigate whether patterns in their development
are present, such as gradual institutionalization, development
from coordinating RBOs to autonomous RBOs, or from a
relatively small to a broad mandate. We did not observe any
progressive or even consistent pattern of development in the cases
studied. In fact, our observations rather confirm Jaspers and
Gupta’s (2014) statement that there is nothing linear in RBO
development and that the evolution of every RBO is context
specific.
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Table 2. Summary of authority, aggregation, boundary, information, and pay-off rules.
 
Name of river basin
organization
Authority rules Aggregation rules Boundary rules Information rules Pay-off rules
Mackenzie River
Basin Board
Delegated mandate
focuses on
coordination,
facilitation, dispute
resolution, and
information gathering
and sharing; pertains to
ecological integrity and
sustainability
Decisions require the
consent of two-thirds
of the members of the
Board
Geographical
boundaries based on
hydrological criteria;
membership is limited
to representatives of
governments and to
Aboriginal peoples
Emphasis on science
and traditional
knowledge; meeting
minutes not public
Budget provided by the
“basin jurisdictions”
Oregon Watershed
Enhancement Board
Delegated mandate for
salmon restoration;
coordinating and
nonregulatory roles;
mobilizing resources
and managing grants;
reporting of results
Majority voting in the
Appointed Board
Partnerships at the
watershed level (all
within Oregon); Board
members represent
different geographical
areas of the state
Science and
experiential knowledge
valued; progress reports
public
Budget provided by state
lottery money and
specific federal grants
Westcountry Rivers
Trust
No formal authorities
delegated; aimed at
leveraging resources,
building collaborative
relations, and fulfilling
advisory and brokerage
roles
Consensus Boundaries defined on
the basis of
hydrological criteria
and water quality and
habitat issues;
voluntary and locally
inclusive participation
Scientific, local, and
experiential knowledge
welcomed
Costs and benefits
shared between
participants
Erftverband Broad delegated
mandate includes water
quality management,
flood management,
sewerage and waste
water treatment, and
water supply
Majority voting;
representation
according to the level
of contribution
Boundaries set on the
basis of hydrological
criteria; mandatory
membership for water
users and polluters
Emphasis on science Water charges and tariffs
levied to members
Portuguese River
Basin District
Authorities and
Councils
Financial and
administrative
autonomy;
coordination;
monitoring; provision;
dispute resolution
Decision making in
councils is consensual
Boundaries based on
hydrological and
ecological criteria;
municipalities and
users associations
represented
Emphasis on science;
much emphasis on
information exchange
between government
layers
Water charges and tariffs
levied to users
Breede-Overberg
Catchment
Management Agency
Mandate for water
allocation, water
resources protection,
water use, development,
conservation,
management, and
control
Mix of elite and
consensus decision
making; strong focus
on egalitarianism
Boundaries based on
natural hydrological
borders and financial
viability; inclusive
decision making
Emphasis on scientific
knowledge; stakeholder
input solicited
Water charges and tariffs
levied to users; seed
funding from the
Ministry of Water and
Environmental Affairs
Western Bug River
Basin Administration
(RBA) and Western
Bug River Basin
Council (RBC)
Delegated mandate to
collect data and to
develop water
management plans,
including specific
measures
RBC takes decisions on
the river basin plan by
majority rule; State
Agency for Water
Management has veto
power
Boundaries based on
hydrological
boundaries of surface
waters; members are
regional and local
authorities,
nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs),
industrial
representatives, and
scientists
Emphasis on science;
NGO input solicited
State funding for RBA
staff  and
implementation;
additional funds from
local government,
charges and tariffs, and
international donors
Lower Kunduz and
Taloquan River Basin
Agencies and Lower
Kunduz and
Taloquan River Basin
Councils
Delegated mandate to
deal with a variety of
water issues (in
practice, addressing
water allocation only)
Water users as key
decision makers (in
practice, use of
traditional “Abandaz”
system)
Boundaries nominally
based on hydrological
criteria; formally, very
inclusive decision
making
Emphasis on science Reasonable upstream-
downstream equity
(con'd)
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Mongolian River
Basin Councils
(RBCs) and River
Basin
Administrations
(RBAs)
Delegated mandate to
coordinate activities of
public and private
parties in the basin, to
draft river basin
management plans, and
to grant water licenses;
RBCs responsible for
public participation
and monitoring of
water use and pollution
(through RBAs and
other organizations);
RBCs formulate
recommendations to
RBAs
RBAs prepare river
basin management
plans, which need
formal approval of
provincial and district
parliaments; RBCs may
submit proposals for
suspending the RBA’s
decisions
Boundaries based on
hydrological,
socioeconomic, and
political criteria;
stakeholder-based
representation in the
RBCs
Emphasis on science;
stakeholder input
solicited; sharing of
data not yet fully
regulated
Charges and tariffs, state
funds, provincial funds,
and international donors
Ping River Basin
Committee and Mae
Kuang Sub-basin
working group
Limited delegated
mandate for
coordination and
planning
Join decision making
but with a strong
editing function of
traditional line-agencies
Boundaries based on
hydrological
considerations; state
and nonstate actors
have access
Emphasis on science;
few requirements to
share information
publicly
State funding through
line agencies
Murray-Darling
Basin Authority,
Murray-Darling
Basin Ministerial
Council (MDBMC),
and Basin community
committee
Delegated mandate for
water allocation
through planning for
and advising to the
government in the field
of water allocation
The Australian
Government Minister
(who is accountable to
the Parliament of
Australia) decides on
the Basin Plan; decision
making in MDBMC
and basin community
committee is based on
consensus
Boundaries based on
hydrological
considerations;
governments decide,
with nonstate actors
consulted
Emphasis on science;
stakeholder input
solicited; data managed
centrally
Government funding;
emphasis on water
markets
Aggregation rules
In international RBOs, the decision-making rule is unanimity in
most cases. Because of the absence of central authority, the so-
called “international anarchy” (Sebenius 1992), basin states need
to reach a consensus to conclude international agreements or
decide on plans and policies. In our case studies, the emphasis
was on cases located within countries. Interestingly, we find that
for such cases, consensus is also frequently used as an aggregation
rule (Table 2; e.g., Westcountry Rivers Trust, a partnership type
of RBO [Cook et al. 2016], as well as most coordinating RBOs).
However, other aggregation rules are also applied; majority voting
was found in a number of cases, e.g., Mackenzie River Basin
Board (Morris and de Loë 2016), Oregon Watershed
Enhancement Board (Lach and Calvert 2014), and Western Bug
River Basin Council (Hagemann and Leidel 2014). In the German
Erftverband case, we find majority voting linked to a principle
that assigns greater voting powers to those that pay more to the
RBO (see Hüesker and Bernhardt 2014). The Ping River Basin
Committee and the Mae Kuang Sub-basin working group in
Thailand are examples of platforms dominated by line agencies.
They essentially are the only relevant voters, and their power is
further underpinned by their control over financial resources,
which they can withhold from the RBO to effectively block
implementation of RBO policies (Ganjanapan and Lebel 2014).
Boundary rules
In our analysis of boundary rules, we made a distinction between
the rules describing the geographical delineation of the RBO and
the inclusiveness of the RBO’s decision-making processes. When
comparing the geographical boundaries of the RBOs, the
difference in scale of the basins studied stands out. The surface
area of the basins studied ranges from the small Mae Kuang
watershed in Thailand (1661 km²; Ganjanapan and Lebel 2014)
to the massive Mackenzie River basin (18 million km²; Morris
and de Loë 2016). We find that scale does matter: it actually
appears to have an effect on the available options in terms of
institutional design. For example, organizing a meeting of the
basin board in the Mackenzie basin, let alone a full-blown
multistakeholder process, is a laborious process, if  only because
of the immense travel distances. Indeed, the partnership type RBO
is exclusively found at the level of relatively small basins. For the
larger basins such as the Mackenzie and Murray Darling basins,
coordinating or agency types of RBOs would appear to be the
most feasible type.  
In accordance with Schlager and Blomquist’s (2008) and Molle
and Wester’s (2009) contention that the definition of the RBO’s
geographical scope and basin boundaries is not a straightforward
technical or scientific exercise, but rather, a process in which other
factors often also play a role, we found ample evidence that the
geographical scope of the RBOs is determined by different criteria
than purely hydrological ones. In the Mongolian case study, apart
from hydrological criteria, economic and political factors played
a role in defining the geographical scope of the RBOs:
“Economically relevant rivers were granted the status of discrete
river basins even when, from a hydrological perspective, they
actually belonged to larger catchments” (Dombrowsky et al.
2014:271). In the Afghan case, the geographical delineation of
the RBOs also does not match hydrological borders. Where sub-
basins proved either too big or were considered too heterogeneous
Ecology and Society 22(2): 41
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss2/art41/
in terms of land use, they were split up. Other relevant factors,
which played a role in the delineation made by the founders, were
the transport costs to attend meetings, the number of council
seats, and the anticipated income through fee collection (Warner
and Thomas 2014). In the South African case study (Meissner et
al. 2016), next to hydrological criteria, the potential for a
catchment management agency to achieve financial viability in
the medium to long term already was and has recently become an
even more important criterion for delineating the geographical
boundaries of the RBOs.  
Our cases confirm previous suggestions that even from a water
centric perspective, it is not easy to delineate a river basin, for
instance, because surface waters might be connected and
groundwater aquifers not (or vice versa). Our case studies show
that this can be a complicating factor in defining the basin
boundaries. Occurrences of this can be found in the case studies
on the Erftverband (Hüesker and Bernhardt 2014) and the
Western Bug River Basin Administration (Hagemann and Leidel
2014). As Dombrowsky et al. (2014:271) explain, in the southern
part of Mongolia, the Gobi Desert, there is no surface water, and
because “not enough was known about the groundwater aquifers
for the catchment areas to be defined, the river basins were defined
by reference to provincial boundaries.” Thus, even if  there is a
willingness to take natural relations into account, the information
on what those are may simply not be available. In other cases such
as the Mackenzie River Basin Board, the definition of the basin
boundaries has not been an issue (Morris and de Loë 2016). This
may be because of the low population density and the lack of
political controversies in the border areas of the basin (and
perhaps the fact that the RBO there is without much real clout).
Interestingly, even if  criteria other than hydrological criteria have
proven important for defining the geographical scope of most
RBOs studied, we have actually not found much evidence for
power struggles or political conflict over the geographical
boundaries of the RBO jurisdictions. The expectation of political
bickering did not materialize in our cases; in its place was
pragmatism: in all basins studied here, parties are pragmatic
enough to define basin boundaries on the basis of criteria other
than hydrological when it is necessary or considered useful.  
The second type of boundary rules concerns the inclusion (or
exclusion) of parties in decision-making processes. The findings
on this rule type are directly related to the type of RBO studied,
which suggests that this rule type is a strong indicator of the type
of organization in question. The Westcountry Rivers Trust, as an
example of a partnership, is characterized by voluntary and broad
participation of societal stakeholders (Cook et al. 2016). In
contrast, an interstate coordinating RBO such as the MacKenzie
River Basin Board includes governmental and First Nations
representatives only (Morris and de Loë 2016). Even though
decision making in the coordinating RBOs may seem fairly
inclusive, more often than not, considerable power remains with
the state. In the South African case study, this power is reflected
in the state’s authority to determine the composition of the
catchment management board. Meissner et al. (2016) argue that
this state power is probably required to manage the challenge of
power differences between vested economic interests and
marginalized parties.  
In the cases discussed here, we do not really see evidence of a shift
in governance, that is, relocation of authority and power from the
nation state to subnational governments or civil society. The
partnership case of the Westcountry Rivers Trust may serve as an
example; there, analysis shows that the Trust/RBO is
complementing rather than replacing the existing, traditional,
hierarchical, governmental institutions (Cook et al. 2016). It
would thus seem safe to conclude that in terms of Thelen’s (2004)
terminology, the foundation of RBOs is normally not an example
of institutional “displacement,” which is associated with power
shifts in the here and now. Instead, the foundation of RBOs can
be better qualified in terms of “layering,” i.e., the foundation of
a new institution on top of existing ones, and a process that is
associated with existing systems that are actually “intractable for
change” in the short term and can only be changed in the long
term, perhaps as a consequence of the new institution
(Comodomos and Ferrer 2011). If  anything, most of our cases
demonstrate how extremely cautious existing institutions are and
how careful they are to curtail the powers of the new RBOs by
arranging for institutional designs that effectively constrain (some
might say straightjacket) new RBOs. Unlike the discussion on
geographical scope and basin boundaries, this is a highly political
process.
Information rules
Information rules regulate the use of specific types of expertise,
data, and information, as well as the openness of data and
information on the status of the basin, and they also pertain to
monitoring and information on the effectiveness of basin policies
to the public. Based on the 11 case studies, we conclude that
scientific expertise (which may relate to all natural sciences,
including ecology but also engineering) really takes center stage
in the design of almost all RBOs because it is almost universally
considered the most relevant source of information for decision
making, monitoring, and reporting. Conversely, experiential
knowledge, be it local, indigenous, or professional knowledge,
was hardly ever considered relevant by those that set up and
designed RBOs, although many RBOs do have to meet a
requirement to solicit knowledge from groups that have such
knowledge (farmers, fishers, inhabitants). These observations are
largely in line with the observation that Jaspers and Gupta (2014)
make: water management is normally considered a highly
technical field. Indeed, the examples of (often Western)
nongovernmental organizations and donor countries trying to
help establish RBOs show that such RBOs are expected to work
almost exclusively on the basis of scientific information while
largely ignoring the traditional and local knowledge embedded
in the existing institutions for water management, even if  later on
it turned out to be essential for the functioning of the water regime.
For example, the case of Afghanistan reveals how the Afghan
“Abandaz” system comprising informal institutions to deal with
upstream-downstream disputes was hardly recognized by the new
institutional architects (Warner and Thomas 2014).  
The selected cases show that attention to other forms of
knowledge is more likely to emerge in partnership type RBOs (see
Lach and Calvert 2014, Cook et al. 2016), perhaps because
different partners with varied expertise are brought on board.
Experiential expertise is brought in, and narrative anecdotes such
as those about success stories play a key role in the functioning
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of the Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board (Lach and Calvert
2014). The Canadian example of the Mackenzie River Basin
Board shows the relevance of clear requirements to incorporate
traditional (Aboriginal) ecological knowledge (Morris and de Loë
2016).  
Finally, and further underpinning our observation that the
foundation of RBOs leads to the layering of institutions, the case
studies also pointed to the politics of information. Even in cases
in which the exchange of information across levels and sectors
was a main objective, such an exchange was hindered by resilient
existing institutional practices that are hostile to such an
exchange. According to Hagemann and Leidel (2014:219), cross-
sectoral information exchange in the Ukraine is hampered
because “[…] historically, communication is organized on a
vertical axis. This means that data travels up from lower to higher
level authorities, but not horizontally between different sectors.”
The foundation of the RBO was supposed to change existing
information rules, but this may only become visible in the longer
term.
Pay-off rules
The case studies display a rich variety of pay-off  rules. These relate
to the various ways in which the staffing of the RBO is financed,
the funding of the policies and measures proposed by the RBO,
and the distribution of costs and benefits among RBO members.
Here too, we see quite a few attempts of existing organizations to
keep the powers of the new RBOs in check: Most RBOs studied
for our comparative analysis are expected to operate on a
shoestring or need to request others to spend money in line with
their plans and policies.  
There are various mechanisms and procedures for setting budgets.
For the management of the Australian Murray Darling basin, the
jurisdictions rely on a negotiated intergovernmental cost-sharing
formula that is supplemented by funding from the Australian
government (Ross and Connell 2016). The Oregon Watershed
Enhancement Board receives a fixed percentage of the revenues
from the state’s lottery (Lach and Calvert 2014). In still other
cases, the user- and polluter-pays principles are used as a means
to allocate costs and benefits among water users. In the German
Erftverband, members generally contribute according to the
amount of water used or polluted (but there are exceptions for
mining companies; Hüesker and Bernhardt 2014). In the
Westcountry Rivers Trust, payments for ecosystem services is
practiced as an alternative to the polluter-pays principle (Cook
et al. 2016). Two or more parties voluntarily reach an agreement
on the provision and payment for ecosystem services, such as
farmers providing water quality services to drinking water
companies. This specific case provides a good example of the ways
in which self-governance and self-organization can operate, albeit
with a certain level of financial aid from the government (by
means of subsidies). Within the substantially different context of
Afghanistan, upstream and downstream water users sometimes
manage to reach an agreement voluntarily on the temporary
release of water by upstream water users to benefit parties
downstream and thus achieve a reasonable upstream-downstream
equity (Warner and Thomas 2014).  
The case studies of developing countries reveal the crucial
importance of financial resources provided by international
donor organizations for the functioning of RBOs. The problem
in these cases is often that resources for staffing the RBOs are
provided and the planning stage is covered, but sufficient
resources for realizing policy measures are lacking.  
Summarizing, the fine-grained institutional analysis of RBOs
revealed that there is no linear pattern of RBO development, the
decision-making rule usually is unanimity or consensus, the
geographical scope of most RBOs is not based on hydrological
criteria only, and scientific knowledge plays a pivotal role in
decision making. The cases studied do not exemplify a shift of
power from the nation state to the RBOs. They rather indicate
that RBOs are an example of institutional layering.
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AND THE POLITICS OF
RIVER BASIN ORGANIZATION FORMATION AND
REFORM
Introduction
Now that we have discussed and compared the main institutional
features of the RBOs, we move on to the second research question
addressing the process of RBO formation and reform. As we have
outlined in the introduction to this special feature, beforehand we
expected some actors such as the international water expert
community, environmentalists, and downstream actors to be
important advocates for the foundation of RBOs, and other
parties such as general purpose governments, economic interests,
and upstream actors to be less interested in this.  
In our comparative study, we found ample evidence for the highly
political nature of RBO formation and reform processes and the
crucial role of change agents therein, but we also learned that the
actions of these agents interact with specific events or triggers,
which, in the literature, are often referred to as windows of
opportunity (Kingdon 1995, Huitema and Meijerink 2009). Table
3 lists the main windows of opportunity and the actors pushing
or hindering RBO formation and reform for each case study. We
found that three (sometimes related) categories of windows of
opportunity have played a role: problem windows, political
windows, and windows related to the adoption of new legislation.
Triggers for river basin organization design and reform: reactions
to shortcomings
What stands out in most of the case studies discussed here is that
institutional reform proposals are often a reaction to observed
shortcomings of the institutional design in place previously. The
typical pattern is that these shortcomings have become clear after
a shock or focusing event or because of persistent water
management problems. In the Canadian case study, concerns
related to the effects of upstream development on the Peace-
Athabasca Delta (in the context of a relatively positive climate
for interprovincial collaboration that has vanished since then) led
the governments of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan,
Yukon, and the Northwest Territories to recognize the need to
coordinate and establish the Mackenzie River Basin Liaison
Committee (Morris and de Loë 2016). In the German case study
of the Erftverband, strongly intensified brown coal mining in the
1950s and the related problems of distributing groundwater
resources between municipalities and mining companies were the
main triggers for legally strengthening the RBO, and when new
challenges such as water pollution were recognized later, the scope
of activities of the RBO was broadened (Hüesker and Bernhardt
2014). In the Mongolian case study, environmental degradation,
Ecology and Society 22(2): 41
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss2/art41/
Table 3. Windows of opportunity and actors pushing or hindering the founding and reform of river basin organizations.
 
Name Windows of opportunity Pushing actors Hindering actors
Mackenzie River Basin Board Problem: drying out of the Peace-
Athabasca Delta
Federal and state governments, but
primarily the downstream
Northwest Territories
Upstream provinces refuse to grant
more power to the Board
Oregon Watershed Enhancement
Board
Legislation: U.S. Endangered Species
Act listing of salmon species
Governor of Oregon Environmental groups who preferred
legal obligations to restore habitat
above voluntary action; republican
legislators because of use of funds
for land acquisition
Westcountry Rivers Trust Problem: failure of existing
institutions to solve pollution and
habitat loss issues effectively
Among others, Arlin Rickard None
Erftverband Problem: issue of distribution of
groundwater resources between
municipalities and mining
companies; later, new challenges
such as water pollution
State of North Rhine Westphalia
enabled the foundation of “special
law water boards”
Registered Society of Rhenish
Brown Coal Plants considered
establishment of the Erftverband
unnecessary
Portuguese River Basin District
Authorities and Councils
Legislation: European Water
Framework Directive
Influential group of Portuguese
water experts and a Minister who
was part of this group
Ministry of Finance, which feared
greater costs; Regional Development
and Coordination Commissions;
technocrats within the national water
institute
South African Catchment
Management Agencies
Political: the country’s democratic
transition
Minister of Water Affairs, Kadar
Asmal
Technocrats within the Department
of Water Affairs and Forestry and
systems modelers opposing
decentralization
Western Bug River Basin
Administration and Council
Political: the country’s transitioning
process after independence
International (donor) organizations,
for example, the European Union
through project TACIS
Existing (hierarchical) institutional
structures from Soviet times
Lower Kunduz and Taloquan
River Basin Agencies and Councils
Political: fall of the Taliban Donor organizations: Germany’s
overseas agency for technical
cooperation and Landell-Mills
consultancy, both hired and funded
by the European Union
Existing institutions such as the
Governor and the traditional
“mirab” and “Abandaz” systems
Mongolian River Basin
Administrations and Councils
Political: decentralization process
after peaceful democratic revolution
Problem: environmental degradation
caused by rapid expansion of the
mining sector
World Wide Fund for Nature; Dutch
water experts; Mongolian water
professionals trained in Eastern
Europe
Some local authorities who feared
they would have to finance new
activities; powerful mining sector
Ping River Basin Committee and
Mae Kuang Sub-basin working
group
Problem: 1997–1998 financial crisis Asian Development Bank, World
Bank, Global Water Partnership
Persistent bureaucratic competition
is detrimental to the success of the
river basin organization
Murray Darling Basin Authority Problem: existing arrangements
proved insufficient to guarantee
water supply during severe drought
conditions such as in 2006–2007
Australian Government; for most
issues, South Australia
State governments other than South
Australia; farmer and irrigator
groups
which was caused by the rapid expansion of the mining sector,
was a main trigger for RBO formation (Dombrowsky et al. 2014).
In the Murray Darling case study, increased water use has led to
increased salinity, substantial degradation of rivers and wetlands,
and losses of native fish, and existing arrangements proved
insufficient to guarantee water supply during severe drought
conditions such as in 2006–2007 (Ross and Connell 2016). For
these reasons, the Australian national government established a
new Murray-Darling basin plan and a new organizational
arrangement to implement it, including a new Murray Darling
Basin Authority. Finally, the development of partnerships in the
UK such as the Westcountry Rivers Trust was a reaction to the
top-down implementation of the European Water Framework
Directives by agency type RBOs and their failure to solve
pollution and habitat loss issues effectively (Cook et al. 2016). In
all these cases, failure of existing water management institutions
to address urgent water management problems served as a main
trigger for either establishing new or reforming existing RBOs.
Finally, the Asian financial crisis was the window of opportunity
that led to the involvement of donor agencies who were
advocating the establishment of RBOs in Thailand (Ganjanapan
and Lebel 2014).  
In addition to persistent problems, new regulations or legislation
may open a window of opportunity for those advocating
institutional change. After the Governor of Oregon’s bad
experiences with the listing of the northern spotted owl under the
U.S. Endangered Species Act and the resultant litigation, he first
tried to prevent a listing of salmon species and later tried to
develop an alternative, bottom-up, approach to the challenge of
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habitat restoration. According to one of the governor’s staff
members: “You don’t recover salmon by issuing orders from
Salem [Oregon’s capital]. But you don’t recover them with orders
from D.C. either. People on the ground have to want to do it. You
can’t make them do it” (Lach and Calvert 2014:111). In a similar
vein, the adoption of the European Water Framework Directive
was exploited by high-level Portuguese policy entrepreneurs to
see through their plans and to establish river basin district
authorities (Thiel and Guerreiro de Brito 2014).  
In still other cases, developments in the broader political
environment opened a window for institutional innovation.
Examples of these are the democratic transition of South Africa
(Meissner et al. 2016), the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan
(Warner and Thomas 2014), the decentralization process after
peaceful democratic revolution in Mongolia (Dombrowsky et al.
2014), and the transitioning process after independence in the
Ukraine (Hagemann and Leidel 2014).
Actors pushing or hindering river basin organization formation
and reform
Although the triggers or windows of opportunity described above
may explain to some extent why initiatives for RBO formation or
reform were taken, only the actors on the ground can interpret
events, exploit windows of opportunity, and initiate institutional
reform processes, or they can try to block or frustrate them. In
our study, we came across five broad categories of actors who
either pushed or hindered the founding or reform of RBOs (Table
3): upstream and downstream parties, parties having vested
economic interests, political parties, general purpose
governments, and international donor organizations.
Upstream and downstream parties
Diverging interests of upstream and downstream water users and
related power asymmetries often translate into disagreements
about RBO design. In the Mackenzie basin, the Government of
the Northwest Territories, which is situated downstream of the
other basin jurisdictions, has advocated changes in the Board’s
membership and funding so as to make the Board more effective,
but reform proposals have not succeeded so far (Morris and de
Loë 2016). Because the Mackenzie River Basin Board is a
coordinating type of RBO, a downstream party such as the
Northwest Territories always needs the cooperation of upstream
parties and therefore is dependent on their willingness to
cooperate. In the Australian case study, South Australia, the
downstream basin state in the Murray-Darling basin, has an
interest in maintaining downstream flows to ensure water supplies
for the state, whereas the other states have supported diversions,
especially for irrigation (Ross and Connell 2016). Likewise, in the
Afghan case, the relationship between upstream and downstream
water users is crucial for understanding the functioning of the
RBO. Interestingly, the traditional Abandaz system, which was
essentially disregarded by foreign donor organizations, was
developed exactly for the purpose of solving allocation issues
between upstream and downstream water users, making the
decision to ignore the system even more perplexing (Warner and
Thomas 2014). Clearly, hydro-politics does not only exist in the
international context but is ubiquitous within states.
Parties with vested economic interests
As in other cases of institutional reform, the case studies included
here demonstrate that parties with vested economic interests are
often more interested in maintaining the status quo than in
institutional reform. For example, in the German case study, the
Registered Society of Rhenish Brown Coal Plants, representing
the interest of the coal industry, considered legal establishment
of the Erftverband unnecessary (Hüesker and Bernhardt 2014).
The mining industry is an important actor in the Mongolian case
study as well. Dombrowsky et al. (2014:286), quoting The
Economist state, “Political support for improved control of the
mining industry [to be achieved in part by the foundation of an
RBO] will most probably remain difficult as the sector is the
largest contributor to the country’s spectacular GDP [gross
domestic product] growth over the last years.” In the Australian
case, farmer and irrigation groups are skeptical about the referral
of Murray-Darling Basin management powers to Australian
government (Ross and Connell 2016). The reason for this may be
because they question the effectiveness of a more centralized river
basin management, but also because they perceive such
centralization as detrimental to their interests.
Political parties
The case studies produce some evidence for the role of party
politics as well. In the case study of the Oregon Watershed
Enhancement Board, Republican legislators opposed the use of
funds for the expropriation of agricultural land to protect
agricultural interests (Lach and Calvert 2014). In Australia, both
main political parties on the national level supported the
centralization of water policies, but on the state level, the liberal
coalitions of Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland all
voiced similar criticisms in response to the basin plan that had
been developed. One of the criticisms was around the uncertain
environmental benefits of the basin plan (Ross and Connell 2016).
The study of transformation of Portuguese RBOs illustrates how
elections and changes in government have played a crucial role in
the institutional reform processes, which has meant that the water
governance system of Portugal has oscillated between two
competing visions for years (Thiel and Guerreiro de Brito 2014).
Finally, the Mongolian case study suggests that the increased
influence of the Green party in that country may have been
conducive to RBO formation (Dombrowsky et al. 2014).
General purpose governments
RBOs are an example of special purpose governments (Skelcher
2006). Unlike general purpose governments such as the nation
state, provinces, or municipalities, RBOs are designed to address
water management issues specifically. The founding of special
purpose governments such as RBOs may come at the cost of the
competencies of general purpose governments. As Jaspers and
Gupta (2014:60) argue in their analysis of global discourse on
RBOs: “[…] RBOs embody a power struggle – a shift of power
from the state to an administrative body at both international and
national level and this power struggle has often led to minimizing
the mandate of the RBO.” The case studies analyzed support these
words (compare our preceding treatment of authority and
information rules). The Australian case study exemplifies this
power struggle: the states reluctantly accepted an increase in
federal powers in return for increased federal contributions (Ross
and Connell 2016). In the Ukrainian (Hagemann and Leidel
2014), Afghan (Warner and Thomas 2014), and Mongolian
(Dombrowsky et al. 2014) case studies, existing (hierarchically
operating) government agencies are hindering effective RBO
formation. In Portugal, the Regional Development and
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Coordination Commissions opposed the founding of river basin
administrations (Thiel and Guerreiro de Brito 2014). Although
the tension between existing general purpose governments and
newly created RBOs stands out in most cases, perhaps because
RBOs are seen as a threat to institutional displacement, some
RBOs such as the Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board (Lach
and Calvert 2015) and the Westcountry Rivers Trust (Cook et al.
2016) not so much rival but complement existing institutions,
which may explain why the struggle over competencies has been
less prominent in these cases. This is an indication that an
institutional layering strategy (Thelen 2004) meets with less
resistance.
International (donor) organizations
Within our set of RBOs, there is a specific category in which
international donor organizations have been the crucial actors
pushing the concept of RBOs and the associated principles of
organizing water management on a basin scale (bioregions) and
undertaking such management in a participatory manner
(referred to as “the holy trinity” by Warner and Thomas [2014]).
Jaspers and Gupta (2014) mention the financial assistance and
the attached conditions related to aid and development projects
as one of several factors that explain why certain water
management discourses are appealing.  
Donor organizations, in turn, are influenced by international
epistemic communities such as the World Water Council, Global
Water Partnership, the International Law Association, and the
engineering community (Jaspers and Gupta 2014). In our
collection of case studies, the Ukraine (Hagemann and Leidel
2014), Afghanistan (Warner and Thomas 2014), Mongolia
(Dombrowsky et al. 2014), and Thailand (Ganjanapan and Lebel
2014) are clear examples of the influence of international donor
organizations on RBO formation. The authors of the Afghan
case study are probably most critical of such organizations
(Warner and Thomas 2014). They point to the lack of proper
problem and institutional analyses and the inaccurate assumption
that water governance in Afghanistan is a “blank slate.” They
illustrate the lack of a proper problem analysis with the example
that “despite no intersectoral conflicts being reported, the Panj-
Amu river basin programme unhelpfully insisted in multi-user
mapping” (Warner and Thomas 2014:240). According to Warner
and Thomas (2014), the main reason for the Afghan government
officials accepting the founding of RBOs as proposed by the EU
was their interest in EU funding of water control infrastructure
projects so that they could carry on with their longstanding
“hydraulic mission” (which is in many ways the opposite of what
the EU strives for in its own legislation such as the Water
Framework Directive). International donors often do not work
alone. For instance, in the Mongolian case study (Dombrowsky
et al. 2014), international actors promoted the RBO concept, but
the founding of RBOs was also supported by Mongolian water
experts who were trained in Europe and Russia, thereby
suggesting the importance of education in forming an epistemic
community. The same concept applies to the Thai case study
(Ganjanapan and Lebel 2014), where the Asian Development
Bank, World Bank, and Global Water Partnership pushed the
RBO concept, but the National Water Resources Committee
endorsed RBO development.  
The empirical findings about actors pushing or hindering RBO
foundation are in accordance with our hypothesis that RBO
formation is not a straightforward technical exercise but a highly
political enterprise.
PERFORMANCE OF RIVER BASIN ORGANIZATIONS
Introduction
In the preceding sections, we compared the institutional design
of RBOs and explored the political dimension of their founding
and reform. We now shift our focus to the RBOs’ performance.
In the introduction to this special feature (Huitema and Meijerink
2017), we discussed criteria that may be used to assess RBOs’
performance, and we questioned whether these organizations
enhance (1) coordination across levels of government, policy
sectors, and between public and private parties; (2) the
accountability of water policies; (3) the legitimacy of water
policies; and (4) the environmental effectiveness of policies (for
the meaning of these criteria see our special feature introduction).
Table 4 summarizes the findings about RBO performance for each
case study. The assessment was qualitative, distinguishing poor,
average, and good performance. We next discuss the main findings
for each criterion.
Coordination
An important argument for founding RBOs is that these
organizations may enhance coordination between different levels,
sectors, and interests, which is key to realizing integrated water
resources management (IWRM). In this respect, the RBOs
included in our study yield distinctly mixed results. The
Mackenzie River Basin Board, an example of a coordinating
RBO, performs relatively poorly when it comes to establishing
coordination across the basin states. Morris and de Loë (2016)
explain how the states may easily bypass the commission, such as
in the case of a new joint monitoring program for the tar sands
region. In the Thai case study, the coordinating RBOs also
perform poorly, and decisions that are crucial for the watershed
are taken elsewhere (Ganjanapan and Lebel 2014). The
Mackenzie River Basin Board remains dependent on the
willingness of contracting parties to conclude bilateral
agreements. According to Morris and de Loë (2016) this is because
of the institutional design of the RBO, which in turn reflects the
political characteristics of the federal state of Canada. This is
quite similar to the Australian case study of the Murray Darling
River Basin Commission (Ross and Connell 2016) in which the
states used to have veto power. However, since the establishment
of the Murray Darling Basin Authority, power has shifted to the
federal government, and coordination may be achieved by
imposing policies on the basin states. Ross and Connell (2016)
doubt whether this more coercive approach will yield better
results.  
The partnership RBOs, the Westcountry Rivers Trust and the
Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board and related watershed
initiatives, perform rather well. The same goes for the two RBOs
that share characteristics with the autonomous RBO type: the
German Erftverband and the Portuguese River Basin District
Authorities. In the latter case, the RBOs have enhanced
coordination within hydrographic basins, but this came at the cost
of less coordination across basins at the national level (Thiel and
Guerreiro de Brito 2014).  
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Table 4. Findings on the performance of the river basin organizations. A rank of “unknown” indicates that no data were available.
 
Performance measure
Name of river basin organization Coordination Accountability Legitimacy Environmental
effectiveness
Mackenzie River Basin Board Poor Average Average Poor
Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board Good Good Good Average
Westcountry Rivers Trust Good Good Good Good
Erftverband Good Good Good Good
Portuguese River Basin District Authorities and
Councils
Average Average Average Unknown
Breede-Overberg Catchment Management Agency Good Average Average Unknown
Western Bug River Basin Administration and
Council
Poor Average Average Unknown
Lower Kunduz and Taloquan River Basin Agencies
and Councils
Poor Poor Poor Poor
Mongolian River Basin Administrations and
Councils
Poor Poor Average Unknown
Ping River Basin Committee and Mae Kuang Sub-
basin working group
Poor Average Poor Poor
Murray-Darling Basin Authority, Murray-Darling
Basin Ministerial Council, Basin community
committee
Average Average Average Unknown
The agency type RBOs, which were founded in the Ukraine
(Hagemann and Leidel 2014), Afghanistan (Warner and Thomas
2014), and Mongolia (Dombrowsky et al. 2014) with the help of
international donor organizations, have been less successful in
achieving coordination so far. The reasons for this difficulty are
the still powerful hierarchical governmental institutions in place,
which hinder cross-sector exchange of information, and the
failure to take account of traditional water management practices
such as the Abandaz system in Afghanistan. The Breede-
Overberg Catchment management agency, however, performs
relatively well (Meissner et al. 2016).
Accountability
Whereas in democracies, general-purpose governments such as
provinces, municipalities, or state governments mostly have a
directly elected council that is accountable to the public (the
electorate), accountability relations of RBOs are more
complicated. River Basin Boards or Councils are not directly
elected and often consist of representatives of lower levels of
government, sometimes supplemented with representatives from
nongovernmental organizations or industries. In these cases, the
RBO is accountable to the representatives of the member
organizations, which in turn are accountable to their
constituencies. Furthermore, the case studies reveal differences
between formal accountability and accountability in practice. As
Morris and de Loë (2016) explain, the Mackenzie River Basin
Board is accountable to the Ministers, but the Ministers are not
held accountable for progress made. The case studies of the
Breede-Overberg Catchment Management Agency (Meissner et
al. 2016), Murray-Darling Basin Authority (Ross and Connell
2016), and the transformation of the Portuguese Water District
Administrations into agencies (Thiel and Guerreiro de Brito 2014)
all illustrate that centralization enhances accountability of the
RBO to the national Ministers and government, but that may
come at the cost of accountability to subnational governments
(or states within a federal state).  
In Ukraine (Hagemann and Leidel 2014), Afghanistan (Warner
and Thomas 2014), and Mongolia (Dombrowsky et al. 2014), the
RBOs have poor performance in terms of accountability. In the
Ukraine case, members of the river basin council are not held
accountable. In Afghanistan, informal institutions and practices
are far more important than the formal ones. In both the
Ukrainian and Mongolian case studies, the respective authors
report that corruption in these countries is widespread
(Dombrowsky et al. 2014, Hagemann and Leidel 2014; see also
Jaspers and Gupta 2014). Again, the Westcountry Rivers Trust
(Cook et al. 2016) and the Oregon Watershed Enhancement
Board and related watershed initiatives (Lach and Calvert 2014)
perform rather well.
Legitimacy
In the introduction to this special feature, we also raised the
question of to what extent RBOs, once founded, enhance the
legitimacy of water management policies. The answer to this
question is positive for the Oregon Watershed Enhancement
Board (Lach and Calvert 2014), the Westcountry Rivers Trust
(Cook et al. 2016), and the German Erftverband (Hüesker and
Bernhardt 2014). The analysts of these case studies all point to
high input and output legitimacy of the RBOs, and perhaps it is
no accident that these are all RBOs that operate on a relatively
small scale and emphasize collective action. The results for the
case studies of the Mackenzie River Basin Board (Morris and de
Loë 2016) and the Breede-Overberg Catchment Management
Agency (Meissner et al. 2016) show a mixed picture. In the former
case, input legitimacy falls short because the contracting parties
have historically failed to engage Aboriginal people and make
effective use of traditional ecological knowledge, and the output
legitimacy is questioned by many. In the latter case, input
legitimacy is considered high because of the involvement of a
wide range of stakeholders, but it is also low because of persistent
major inequalities between stakeholders. The case studies in
which international donor organizations played a key role in
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initiating the founding of RBOs, i.e., Ukraine, Afghanistan,
Mongolia, and Thailand, show poor to average performance.
Hagemann and Leidel (2014) refer to low nongovernmental
organization participation in the Ukrainian Western Bug basin,
and Warner and Thomas (2014) refer to a lack of support for
newly established RBOs and greater support for the much less
democratic yet still effective institutions in place. Dombrowsky et
al. (2014) are slightly more positive, concluding that Mongolian
River Basin Councils, to some extent, have enhanced the
legitimacy of river basin policies. Ganjanapan and Lebel (2014)
point to the lack of public participation in the Mae Kuang
watershed, and Ross and Connell (2016) come to the conclusion
that the recently adopted centralized, top-down approach to river
basin management in Australia has, to some extent, reduced input
legitimacy at regional and local levels.
Environmental effectiveness
The criterion of environmental effectiveness provided the greatest
challenge for the authors participating in this comparative project.
In their assessments, they primarily relied on expert judgments,
but were faced with several complications, not the least of which
is the attribution problem. Because RBOs operate within complex
institutional environments in which many other organizations
affect the state of water systems through their policies or activities,
it is not possible to isolate the effect of contributions made by the
RBOs. The authors who studied recent examples of the founding
or reform of RBOs obviously argued that it was too early to make
such judgments because there is a time lag between the founding
of an RBO and the first policies and action plans being drafted,
let alone the actual implementation of those plans. However,
other authors did find some evidence of environmental
effectiveness. In the case of the Murray-Darling basin
organization, for instance, a plan was drafted that included
comprehensive measures to improve environmental performance,
although Ross and Connell (2016) point to the serious risk of
implementation failure for the RBO because of distrust between
the main actors and the withdrawal of financial contributions by
the states. Morris and de Loë (2016) argue that the environmental
effectiveness of the Mackenzie River Basin Board is quite low.
They suggest that this should not be attributed to a poorly
functioning organization per se, but to the institutional design
(and specifically, the authority and aggregation rules) of the
Board, which leaves all decision-making power with the basin
jurisdictions. The environmental performance of the Oregon
Watershed Enhancement Board is less clear. Although the Board
is generally perceived as successful in stimulating numerous
habitat restoration projects, there is no proof of recovery of the
salmon population yet (Lach and Calvert 2014); in addition, it is
not possible to compare the current approach in Oregon with the
state’s initially intended approach because that approach was
politically unfeasible, potentially suggesting a tension between
effectiveness and feasibility.  
Similar to the other criteria, the German Erfverband performs
well in the view of almost all decision makers and stakeholders.
According to Hüesker and Bernhardt (2014), the problem-solving
capacity of the Erftverband and similar water boards in the state
of North Rhine Westphalia is higher compared to the
environmental performance of state’s regions where such water
boards are absent. The Westcountry Rivers Trust (Cook et al.
2016) also performs well: best management practices are
introduced, advice is produced for farmers, landscape restoration
is achieved, and farm efficiency savings are made. Ganjanapan
and Lebel (2014), however, are rather negative about the
effectiveness of the Thai RBOs they studied because, in their eyes,
the RBOs avoid difficult allocation issues, and decisions that really
matter are taken elsewhere, including by the previously existing
institutions. Finally, in the Afghan case study, environmental
issues simply have not been recognized at all (Warner and Thomas
2014). However, as in the Thai case, the Afghan case does
demonstrate how older institutions sometimes continue to work
despite the new layer, so perhaps there is still hope for success.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RIVER BASIN
ORGANIZATION DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE:
LESSONS LEARNED
Introduction
We use the remainder of this article to explore the
interrelationship between design and performance. In other
words, which design features inhibit or enhance an RBO’s
performance? This question is as difficult to answer as it is relevant
because there are many factors that potentially affect an RBO’s
performance, and it is difficult to disentangle these factors, let
alone assess their relative importance (attribution is difficult).
However, we observed several salient patterns that suggest
connections between RBO design and performance that deserve
attention. In the rich collection of case studies, four factors stand
out as being particularly relevant to (re)designing RBOs: (1)
institutional interplay or the relationship between the RBO and
its broader (previously existing) institutional environment; (2) the
ability to generate sufficient resources not only for staffing the
RBO, but also for realizing its policies; (3) the dilemma of
centralization and decentralization of basin policies; and (4) the
time required for RBO reform and impact. Each of these aspects
are examined next.
Institutional interplay
RBOs are examples of special-purpose organizations that are
organized on a basin scale. With the exception of the Oregon
Watershed Enhancement Board, a case that stands out somewhat
in this respect, the geographical scope of each of the RBOs
analyzed was at least partially based on hydrological boundaries.
Although we saw that administrative, financial, economic, and
other pragmatic considerations also play a role in carving out river
basin boundaries (see also the section on boundary rules), for the
cases included in this study, a claim could be made that the
geographical scope of the RBO does correspond, at least to some
degree, with the scale at which water management issues manifest
themselves. In other words, there is a certain level of fit between
the institutions and the bioregions they aim to manage, an
outcome that is in line with the international discourse on RBOs.
However, at the same time, and quite revealingly, the case studies
examined give every indication that the realization of spatial fit
between problems and institutions is no guarantee of good
performance. In fact, a more influential factor for performance
is the relation of the new RBOs to the existing institutional
environment, which may be called “institutional interplay”
(compare Young 2002). The case studies show that discussions
about the foundation of RBOs do not take place in a vacuum;
many tasks potentially taken up by a new RBO are normally
already performed by existing organizations. In addition, whereas
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many proponents of RBOs hope for “strong” RBOs that take
over many of these tasks and integrate them (“institutional
displacement” in Thelen’s [2004] terms), the reality is that “weak”
RBOs with relatively few powers are much more politically
feasible in practice. The consequence is that new RBOs are layered
on top of existing organizations, and previously existing
organizations take varying degrees of control over the new RBOs.
Therefore, the RBOs examined were almost always highly
dependent on other organizations for realizing their objectives,
and their performance was highly dependent on the effective
management of institutional interplay. Problematic institutional
interplay stands out as a key factor that causes poor RBO
performance.  
This effect is particularly evident in the cases in which
international donor organizations, instead of national or local
actors, were the main instigators of institutional change. It would
seem that “institutional engineering” by such actors is
characterized by a lack of knowledge about the existing structures
or a lack of awareness that the relations between these and the
new RBO should be defined. Indeed, Hagemann and Leidel
(2014:230,224) conclude that in the Ukraine, “[…] the RBOs have
been installed within an existing system without having their
interrelationship to the other authorities clearly defined,” and,
about these other authorities, they state, “They keep working on
their assigned tasks and follow the old institutional structures
from Soviet times. This means they are strictly subordinated to
their superiors, particularly the Ministries.” Similar observations
were made regarding the Afghan case study (Warner and Thomas
2014), where a new formal system was introduced that reflects
many traits of the modern IWRM discourse (e.g., the devolution
of power and stakeholder participation) but ignores the
traditional Abandaz system that continues to influence decision
making on the ground. As Warner and Thomas (2014:235) argue,
this “pure,” imported version of an RBO immediately failed when
water allocation problems surfaced and was replaced by a
sporadically emerging ad-hoc variety of mixing formal and
informal institutions, which performed reasonably well. These
findings correspond with Jaspers and Gupta’s (2014:56)
observation that “many of these discourses [about water
governance] are imported into the developing countries and may,
on occasion, even be seen as alien to local cultures.” Dombrowsky
et al. (2014) recognize the relevance of institutional interplay as
well. They conclude that the Mongolian democratization and
decentralization process, which started in the 1990s, has not been
completed yet, a factor that substantially influences RBO
performance. Therefore, they suggest that the evolution of the
overall governance context is highly relevant to understanding the
functioning of the RBOs. Ganjanapan and Lebel (2014:307) also
emphasize the relevance of institutional interplay for
understanding RBO performance when they argue, “As local
administrative organisations have become increasingly important
in terms of budget allocation and natural resources management
responsibilities within their jurisdictions, it is difficult to plan or
manage based on watershed units alone.”  
Interplay is an issue for Western RBOs as well. Morris and de Loë
(2016) basically conclude that the success of the Mackenzie River
Basin Board, as an example of a coordinating type RBO, is in the
hands of the governments of the participating provinces and
territories. One may argue that this is because of the limited
competencies granted to the commission by the basin states, but
even in the case of the Murray-Darling basin organization, which
has more competencies to see through its basin policies, Ross and
Connell (2016) point to the relevance of institutional interplay.
They argue that it remains to be seen whether the institutional
redesign of basin institutions will be successful in the end because
the many different parties involved in the implementation of river
basin policies have ample opportunities to frustrate the
implementation process. These findings relate to the fundamental
question posed by Jaspers and Gupta (2014:43) “whether water
is a ‘sector’ in itself  or a cross-cutting issue and whether it should
be dealt with in relation to its nexus with other sectors and
priorities in society.” Because the drivers of change in the water
sector often arise in other sectors that have other priorities, “[…]
this may lead to questioning the very basis of the RBO whose
fundamental logic is the hydrological entity encapsulated in a
river” (Jaspers and Gupta 2014:58). The experts engaged in RBO
design seem to embrace modern water discourses so
enthusiastically that they tend to forget to perform sound problem
analysis (see also Warner and Thomas 2014) and to take account
of the specificities of the institutional environment in which they
are working, and thus they underestimate the inertia and path-
dependent development of institutions. Given the results of the
case studies, we would not go as far to advise against the founding
of RBOs at all, but rather to take better account of and establish
connectivity with the institutions in place.
Resources
A second factor that deserves attention is also related to political
battles that predate the foundation of RBOs. In practice, the
ability of the RBOs to generate resources for both staffing the
RBO and realizing its river basin policies turns out to be very
limited. This relates to the pay-off rules that we discussed. The
ability to generate resources is a crucial success factor for RBO
performance. The Mackenzie River Basin Board has a secretariat
with a staff  of one person with a rather limited budget, which
reflects the (un)willingness of the states to share powers with an
RBO (Morris and de Loë 2016). The limited resources and the
unwillingness to share power may explain the overall poor
performance of this coordinating type RBO. This straightforward
argument presents a fundamental structure-agency, or chicken
and egg, problem. Of course, one might dream about powerful,
integrative, and inclusive RBOs that are also able to generate the
necessary resources, but such organizations may only be realized
once other actors are willing to share their powers. The case
studies show that they generally are not inclined to do so; hence,
institutional interplay remains crucial.  
We observed some creative examples of resource acquisitions in
the cases studied. The Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board
has 27 staff  members and receives 7.5% of lottery revenues in
Oregon, which makes it a relatively powerful and successful
organization (Lach and Calvert 2014). The relatively strong
performance of the Westcountry River Trust could partly be
attributed to the partnership’s ability to mobilize (mainly EU)
financial resources successfully (Cook et al. 2016). In the German
Erftverband, good performance should partly be attributed to the
RBO’s ability to generate its own resources through the collection
of user and pollution fees (Hüesker and Bernhardt 2014). In sharp
contrast with these successful cases is Ukraine: fees collected from
water users are all sent to the national government in Kiev, which
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makes only 30% of the proceeds available for investment in water
resources management (Hagemann and Leidel 2014). In the
Mongolian case study, the staffing of the RBO is secured through
the national budget, but no financial resources have been allocated
for drafting and implementing plans. Although new legal
arrangements for water pricing and collecting fees were made
recently, their implementation is uncertain because water-
monitoring institutions are still underequipped and understaffed
(Dombrowsky et al. 2014). Ganjanapan and Lebel (2014:312) also
point to the relevance of sufficient resources, stating, “The first
decade has been largely spent filling and re-filling committees and
working groups which rarely meet and have only very modest
budgets, little dedicated office support and limited authority.” The
Australian case is a very specific one because of the increasingly
influential role of the water market. The federal government
continues to buy water rights as a means to return water resources
to environmentally sustainable levels of extraction, and the
Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder is expected to
become an even more powerful actor in the future. In short, the
cases studies reveal different mechanisms for generating resources
for staffing RBOs and for implementing basin policies, and
because such mechanisms are highly relevant for RBO
performance, they deserve attention to be paid to their
institutional design.
Dilemma of (de)centralization
A third common theme running through the case studies relates
to the dilemma of (de)centralization. The dilemma, which affects
both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the RBOs, is that
centralized and closed decision-making processes may enable the
RBO to make good progress and to develop “rational” policies
taking into account the hydrological relations within and across
large basins. However, such a centralized approach also typically
comes at the cost of (input) legitimacy. In contrast, decentralized
and open decision-making processes may enhance legitimacy but
slow down decision making and lead to suboptimal outcomes at
larger scales.  
In the case studies presenting longitudinal analyses of RBO
development, we observed parties struggling with this dilemma
and quite a bit of oscillation between the two ends of the
spectrum. In the South African case study, after major efforts
were made to decentralize basin policies and to organize more
inclusive processes, the poor progress made with this approach
recently triggered a process of increased centralization (Meissner
et al. 2016). “[..] there are indications that future CMA
[Catchment Management Agency] establishment processes […]
will be conducted by means of more streamlined processes that
focus primarily on efficiency and only draw in stakeholders where
needed. While this development may speed up the CMA
establishment process countrywide, it may have negative
consequences for more marginalized stakeholders to participate
in the CMA process and to ensure that their interests are
represented” (Meissner et al. 2016). In Australia, the lack of
results from the interstate Murray Darling Basin Commission was
the main reason for the Australian federal state to centralize water
management competencies and to establish new Murray Darling
basin organizational arrangements (Ross and Connell 2016).
Likewise, their poor performance in establishing coordination
across basins (besides the predominant hope for financial savings)
was an important reason for the Portuguese national government
to start reforming the River Basin District Authorities, which are
an example of autonomous RBOs, into agency-type
organizations again, so as to increase the possibilities for steering
and controling these organizations (Thiel and Guerreiro de Brito
2014). The researchers who investigated the Portuguese and
Australian case studies express serious doubts about the
effectiveness of these changes, mainly because support for the
reform by parties who need to implement the new structures is
often lacking. Based on these observations, we suggest that parties
involved in reform processes should develop a better awareness
of the inherent dilemmas of either decentralizing or centralizing
basin policies. They would be better to try to compensate carefully
for perceived drawbacks of either one of the approaches rather
than to organize the system radically once again. This brings us
to our final observation, which is on the relevance of time in
institutional design processes and assessing RBOs’ performance.
Time
If  the discussion on the formation and design of RBOs already
shows much signs of political bickering (although not always on
the topics we expected), several of the case studies show that this
is far from the end of such politicking. Once the organizations
have been established, the struggle over their institutional design
and performance often continues. The reason for this is that new
organizations that are layered on top of existing ones can
eventually transform an institutional regime. To prevent that risk
from materializing, opponents of RBOs and those with a different
view of their appropriate design try to redesign the institutions if
they get the chance. However, this means that a certain design has
very limited time to settle and to prove itself. Indeed, several
authors questioned the speed with which RBOs are being
reformed. Basically, their argument is that the system in place was
not granted sufficient time to prove effective. As one of the
informants on the Mongolian case study states, “The work with
the four river basin councils had just started working very well,
people were aware of river basin management and integrated
water resources management, and then this work was suddenly
stopped” (Dombrowksy et al. 2014:284). Likewise, Thiel and
Guerreiro de Brito (2014) ask why the seemingly promising River
Basin District Authorities were not granted more time to prove
themselves, and Ross and Connell (2016) question whether the
Murray-Darling Basin Commission was given enough time to
become successful. “[… T]he effectiveness of new initiatives has
been reduced because initiatives are overtaken or abandoned
before they have had time to prove themselves or before they have
been properly evaluated” (Ross and Dovers 2008, as quoted by
Ross and Connell 2016). These observations underscore our claim
that those involved in reform processes should be careful with
introducing frequent radical changes.  
Our study on the design and performance of different types of
RBOs demonstrates that realizing a bioregional approach, which
is one of the key prescriptions of adaptive comanagement
(Huitema et al. 2009), is not an easy task. It inevitably involves
the development of new institutions, which may vary from light
coordination structures to the foundation of more powerful
organizations. More often than not, these new institutions are
perceived as a threat by preexisting institutions, which may not
be interested in realizing a bioregional approach. Therefore, the
establishment of institutions supporting a bioregional approach
is invariably a political process. This implies that the roles and
Ecology and Society 22(2): 41
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss2/art41/
tasks of the organizations involved need to be negotiated, and
interplay between these organizations needs to be managed.
Another design issue that warrants attention is the ability of the
institutions to generate sufficient resources both for planning on
a bioregional scale and for implementing the necessary measures.
Finally, newly established institutions for bioregional
management should be granted sufficient time to prove successful,
and institutional changes should be based on careful monitoring
and evaluation of institutional performance.  
To conclude, it seems that the foundation of autonomous or
agency type of RBOs has much in common with a Pyrrhus victory.
The proponents may be successful in establishing a powerful
RBO, but the more power and resources the RBOs has, the more
opponents will be inclined to regain power and to hinder the
RBO’s success. This situation may easily lead to one in which high
expectations are not met. It might well be that establishing lighter,
coordinating or partnership types of RBOs is a more effective
strategy in the long run because such RBOs meet with less
resistance.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/9388
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